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Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights
(04-1152)
Ruling Below: (Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3r Cir.
N.J., 2004), cert granted 125 S. Ct. 1977 73 USLW 3648 [2005]).
The Solomon Amendment ("the Amendment"), 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds certain federal
funds from colleges and universities that deny military recruiters the same access to their campus
and students that they provide for other employers. The Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights ("FAIR"), an association of law schools and faculty members, challenged the
constitutionality of the Amendment on free speech grounds. After a New Jersey federal district
judge denied FAIR's motion to prevent federal agencies from enforcing the Amendment, FAIR
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Agreeing with FAIR, the Third Circuit
held that law schools were expressive associations and that enforcing the Amendment impaired
their message of non-discrimination, compelling the schools to propagate, accommodate, and
subsidize ideas that they opposed. Furthermore, the Third Circuit concluded that the possibility
of irreparable harms from the compelled speech justified a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Amendment.
Question Presented: Whether the Solomon Amendment's requirement of equal access for
military recruiters violates the First Amendment.
FORUM FOR ACADEMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
V.
Donald H. RUMSFELD, United States Secretary of Defense, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
Decided November 29, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
AMBRO, Circuit Judge:
The Solomon Amendment, 10 US.C. § 983,
requires the United States Department of
Defense ("DOD") to deny federal funding to
institutions of higher education that prohibit
military representatives access to and
assistance for recruiting purposes. Last fall,
the Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc. ("FAIR"), an association of
law schools and law faculty, asked the
United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey to enjoin enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment. The District Court
denied FAIR's motion. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J.
2003) ("FAIR"). On appeal, we hold that
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FAIR has demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits of its First Amendment
claims and that it is entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief. Accordingly, we reverse.
I. Background Facts and Procedural Posture
A. Law Schools' Nondiscrimination Policies
[The court discussed the movement of nearly
every law school to include sexual orientation
as a protected category in their
nondiscrimination policies with respect to
prospective employers.]
B. Congress Passes the Solomon Amendment
The United States military excludes service
members based on evidence of homosexual
conduct and/or orientation. See 10 U.S.C. §
654. Citing their nondiscrimination policies,
some law schools began in the 1980s refusing
to provide access and assistance to military
recruiters. This caught the attention of
members of Congress. In 1994,
Representative Gerald Solomon of New York
sponsored an amendment to the annual
defense appropriation bill that proposed to
withhold DOD funding from any educational
institution with a policy of denying or
effectively preventing the military from
obtaining entry to campuses (or access to
students on campuses) for recruiting
purposes....
During debate in the House of
Representatives, Representative Solomon
urged the passage of his amendment "on
behalf of military preparedness" because
'recruiting is the key to an all-volunteer
military.". . . The amendment's co-sponsor,
Representative Richard Pombo of California,
said Congress needed to target "policies of
ambivalence or hostility to our Nation's armed
services" that are "nothing less than a
backhanded slap at the honor and dignity
of service in our Nation's Armed Forces." .
Other Representatives opposed the
amendment, alleging violations of
academic freedom and civil rights. . . . In
light of Vietnam War-era legislation, rarely
invoked, that already granted the DOD
discretion to withhold funding from
colleges and universities that barred
military recruiters, . . . the DOD itself
objected to the proposed amendment as
"unnecessary" and "duplicative." . . . The
DOD also feared that withholding funds
from universities could be potentially
harmful to defense research initiatives.
But the House voted for the amendment by
a vote of 271 to 126. . . . Several months
later the Senate approved the defense
spending appropriations bill, including
Representative Solomon's amendment, and
the "Solomon Amendment" ultimately
became law.
C. Subsequent Amendments and
Regulatory Interpretations
In 1997 Congress amended the Solomon
Amendment by expanding its penalty to
include, in addition to DOD funds, funds
administered by other federal agencies,
including the Departments of
Transportation, Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education. . . . DOD
regulations have clarified this expansion,
penalizing an offending "subelement" of a
college or university (i.e., a law school)
that prohibits or effectively prevents
military recruiting with the loss of federal
funding from all of the federal agencies
identified in the statute, while withholding
from the offending subelement's parent
institution only DOD funds. 32 C.F.R. §
216.3(b)(1).
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The 1999 amendment also codified
exceptions to the Solomon Amendment's
penalties for schools that (1) have ceased an
offending policy or practice, or (2) have a
longstanding religious-based policy of
pacifism. § 549, 113 Stat. at 610(c) (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 983(c))....
Following the 1999 amendment, the DOD
enforced the Solomon Amendment consistent
with its terms. Only schools whose policies
or practices "prohibited, or in effect
prevented," military representatives "from
gaining entry to campuses . . . for purposes of
military recruiting," were penalized.
But following the terrorist attacks in the
United States in September 2001, the DOD
began applying an informal policy of
requiring not only access to campuses, but
treatment equal to that accorded other
recruiters....
. . . .In light of the millions of dollars at stake,
every law school that receives federal funds
had, by the 2003 recruiting season, suspended
its nondiscrimination policy as applied to
military recruiters.
This past summer Congress amended the
Solomon Amendment to codify the DOD's
informal policy. Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat.
1811, 1911 (2004). Now, under the terms of
the statute itself, law schools and their parent
institutions are penalized for preventing
military representatives from gaining entry to
campuses for the purpose of military
recruiting "in a manner that is at least equal in
quality and scope to the [degree of] access to
campuses and to students that is provided to
any other employer." 10 U.S. C. § 983(b).
D. Current Litigation
In September 2003, FAIR sued the DOD
and the other federal departments whose
funds are restricted under the Solomon
Amendment, seeking on constitutional
grounds a preliminary injunction enjoining
enforcement of the statute and the
then-existing (now codified) informal
policy. ...
II. Jurisdiction
[The Court affirmed that it had jurisdiction
over the constitutional question.]
Ill. Analysis
To obtain a preliminary injunction FAIR
must [prove] (1) a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm
absent the injunction, (3) that the harm to
FAIR absent the injunction outweighs the
harm to the Government of granting it, and
(4) that the injunction serves the public
interest. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at
157....
A. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
FAIR argues that the Solomon
Amendment is an unconstitutional
condition. Under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the Government "may
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in
freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S.
Ct. 2694 (1972). If Congress "could deny
a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited." Id. Put another way, the
Government may not propose a penalty to
"produce a result which [it] could not
command directly." Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460, 78 S.
4
Ct. 1332 (1958). . . . Thus, if the law schools'
compliance with the Solomon Amendment
compromises their First Amendment rights,
the statute is an unconstitutional condition.
B. First Amendment Analysis
The First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend. I.
This simple commandment plays out
differently depending on the avenue of
analysis. Two avenues applicable here are:
(1) whether the law schools are "expressive
associations" whose First Amendment right to
disseminate their chosen message is impaired
by the inclusion of military recruiters on their
campuses; and (2) whether the law schools
are insulated by free speech protections from
being compelled to assist military recruiters in
the expressive act of recruiting.
A violation of freedom of speech under either
analytical approach draws down the curtain
on Solomon Amendment enforcement unless
the Government can establish that the statute
withstands strict scrutiny. The levels of
scrutiny applicable in the First Amendment
context are crucial. A regulation that disrupts
an expressive association or compels speech
must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest, and must
use the least restrictive means of promoting
the Government's asserted interest (here,
recruiting talented lawyers). . . . Needless to
say, this is an imposing barrier.
1. Expressive Association
FAIR argues that the Solomon Amendment
impairs law schools' First Amendment rights
under the doctrine of expressive association.
The Supreme Court most recently addressed
this doctrine in BSA v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
147 L. Ed. 2d 554, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
There the Court held that a state public
accommodations law that prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation
could not constitutionally be invoked to
force the Boy Scouts to accept openly gay
James Dale as an assistant scoutmaster. Id.
at 659. Central to its analysis was the
deference it gave to the Boy Scouts' "view
of what would impair its expression,"
which compelled the Court's conclusion
that Dale's presence would "significantly
burden the Boy Scouts' desire to not
'promote homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."' Id. at 653.
Under Dale, the elements of an expressive
association claim are (1) whether the group
is an "expressive association," (2) whether
the state action at issue significantly affects
the group's ability to advocate its
viewpoint, and (3) whether the state's
interest justifies the burden it imposes on
the group's expressive association. Id, at
648-58. We apply each in turn to analyze
FAIR's expressive association claim.
(a) The law schools are expressive
associations.
A group that engages in some form of
public or private expression above a de
minimis threshold is an "expressive
association." Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at
443. The group need not be an advocacy
group or exist primarily for the purpose of
expression. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. The
Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts,
which "seeks to transmit . . . a system of
values, engages in expressive activity." Id.
at 650.
"By nature, educational institutions are
highly expressive organizations, as their
philosophy and values are directly
inculcated in their students." The Circle
School, 381 F.3d at 182. Because FAIR
has shown that the law schools "possess
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clear educational philosophies, missions and
goals," id., we agree with the District Court's
conclusion that they qualify as expressive
associations, FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 303-
04. Therefore, FAIR satisfies the first
element of the Dale analysis.
(b) The Solomon Amendment significantly
affects the law schools' ability to express their
viewpoint.
FAIR argues that the Solomon Amendment
significantly affects law schools' ability to
express their viewpoint, reflected in their
policies, that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is wrong. The Solomon
Amendment compels them, they contend, to
disseminate the opposite message. The
schools believe that, by coordinating
interviews and posting and publishing
recruiting notices of an employer who
discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation, they impair their ability to teach
an inclusive message by example....
In Dale, the Supreme Court recognized that
"the forced inclusion of an unwanted person
in a group" could significantly affect the
group's ability to advocate its public or private
viewpoint. 530 U.S. at 648....
Just as the Boy Scouts believed that
"homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the
Scout Oath," id. at 652, the law schools
believe that employment discrimination is
inconsistent with their commitment to justice
and fairness. Just as the Boy Scouts
maintained that "homosexuals do not provide
a role model consistent with the expectations
of Scouting families," id., the law schools
maintain that military recruiters engaging in
exclusionary hiring "do not provide a role
model consistent with the expectations of,"
id, their students and the legal community.
Just as the Boy Scouts endeavored to
"inculcate [youth] with the Boy Scouts'
values both expressively and by
example," id. at 649-50, the law schools
endeavor to "inculcate" their students with
their chosen values by expression and
example in the promulgation and
enforcement of their nondiscrimination
policies. FAIR Br. at 22-25. And just as
"Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would,
at the very least, force the organization to
send a message, both to youth members
and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form
of behavior," Dale, 530 U.S. at 653, the
presence of military recruiters "would, at
the very least, force the law schools to
send a message," both to students and the
legal community, that the law schools
''accept" employment discrimination "as a
legitimate form of behavior." Id.
Notwithstanding this compelling analogy,
the District Court distinguished our case
from Dale by suggesting there was a
critical difference between the forced
inclusion of a gay assistant scoutmaster
and the forced presence of an "unwanted
periodic visitor," the military recruiter, in
the context of a larger recruiting effort.
FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 304, 305. While
there was "no question" that the gay
scoutmaster would "undermine the Boy
Scouts' ability to . . . inculcate its values in
younger members," the District Court
wrote, the Solomon Amendment does not
compel the law schools to accept the
military recruiters as a "member" and does
not "bestow upon them any semblance of
authority." Id. at 305.
But our Court has recently held that
compulsory accommodation of a
government-prescribed message may
violate schools' First Amendment
expressive association rights, even when
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that message involves our most revered
affirmations of American patriotism-the
Pledge of Allegiance and our National
Anthem, is only minimally intrusive and lacks
the schools' imprimatur. The Circle School,
381 F.3d at 182. . . . Certainly, the temporal
duration of a burden on First Amendment
rights is not determinative of whether there is
a constitutional violation. . . . Similarly, the
fact that the schools can issue a general
disclaimer does not erase the First
Amendment infringement at issue here, for
the schools are still compelled to speak the
[Government's] message.")....
Moreover, the District Court's scrutiny of the
law schools' belief that the presence of
military recruiters will undermine their
expressive message about fairness and social
justice violates the Dale Court's instruction to
"give deference to an association's view of
what would impair its expression." 530 U.S.
at 653. . . . In other words, the reason why
there was "no question" . . . that a gay
scoutmaster would undermine the Boy Scouts'
message was because the Boy Scouts said it
would. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. In our case,
FAIR has supplied written evidence of its
belief that the Solomon Amendment's forcible
inclusion of and assistance to military
recruiters undermines their efforts to
disseminate their chosen message of
nondiscrimination. Accordingly, we must
give Dale deference to this belief, and
conclude that FAIR likely satisfies the second
element of an expressive association claim.
(c) Balancing of interests
The third step in evaluating an expressive
association claim is "balancing the First
Amendment interests implicated by the
Solomon Amendment with competing
societal interests to determine whether the
statute transgresses constitutional
boundaries." FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
We need not linger on this analysis.
Rarely has government action been
deemed so integral to the advancement of a
compelling purpose as to justify the
suppression or compulsion of speech. We
presume that the Government has a
compelling interest in attracting talented
military lawyers. But "it is not enough to
show that the Government's ends are
compelling; the means must be carefully
tailored to achieve those ends." Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93, 109 S. Ct.
2829 (1989).
As we explain in the final section of our
opinion . . . the Solomon Amendment
could barely be tailored more broadly,
Unlike a typical employer, the military has
ample resources to recruit through
alternative means. For example, it may
generate student interest by means of loan
repayment programs. And it may use
sophisticated recruitment devices that are
generally too expensive for use by civilian
recruiters, such as television and radio
advertisements. These methods do not
require the assistance of law school space
or personnel. And while they may be more
costly, the Government has given us no
reason to suspect that they are less
effective than on-campus recruiting.
The availability of alternative, less speech-
restrictive means of effective recruitment
is sufficient to render the Solomon
Amendment unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny analysis. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126;
The Circle School, 381 F.3d at 182. But
our path in this case is even clearer. The
Government has failed to proffer a shred of
evidence that the Solomon Amendment
materially enhances its stated goal. And
not only might other methods of
recruitment yield acceptable results, they
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might actually fare better than the current
system. In fact, it may plausibly be the case
that the Solomon Amendment, which has
generated much ill will toward the military
on law school campuses, actually impedes
recruitment.
FAIR likely satisfies the three elements of
an expressive association claim. The law
schools are expressive associations, they
believe the message they choose to express
is impaired by the Solomon Amendment,
and no compelling governmental interest
exists in the record to justify this
impairment. Therefore, FAIR has a
reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits of its expressive association claim
against the Solomon Amendment.
2. Compelled Speech
The Supreme Court has long recognized
that, in addition to restricting suppression of
speech, "the First Amendment may prevent
the government from . . . compelling
individuals to express certain views."
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405, 410, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438, 121 S. Ct.
2334 (2001). . . . "At the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for himself or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence."
Turner Broad Sys, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994).
Consistent with this principle, the Supreme
Court has found impermissible compelled
speech in three categories of government
action [that which forces a private individual
to propagate a message chosen by the
government, that which forces a private
individual to propagate another private
individual's message, and that which forces
a private individual to subsidize speech
which the individual opposes]. . . . FAIR
argues that the Solomon Amendment forces
law schools to propagate, accommodate, and
subsidize the military's recruiting, and
therefore implicates each of the three
varieties of compelled speech cases.
. . . As we explain in the analysis that
follows, the military's recruiting is
expressive of a message with which the law
schools disagree. To comply with the
Solomon Amendment, the law schools must
affirmatively assist military recruiters in the
same manner they assist other recruiters,
which means they must propagate,
accommodate, and subsidize the military's
message. In so doing, the Solomon
Amendment conditions funding on a basis
that violates the law schools' First
Amendment rights under the compelled
speech doctrine.
(a) Recruiting is expression
The expressive nature of recruiting is
evident by the oral and written
communication that recruiting entails:
published and posted announcements of the
recruiter's visit, published and oral
descriptions of the employer and the jobs it
is trying to fill, and the oral communication
of an employer's recruiting reception and
one-on-one interviews. The expressive
nature of recruiting is also evident in its
purpose-to convince prospective
employees that an employer is worth
working for. So understood, recruiting
necessarily involves "communication of
information, the dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas, and the
advocacy of causes"-the hallmarks of First
Amendment expression. Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Eny't,
444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). ...
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We agree with the District Court that
soliciting and proselytizing are obvious
forms of expressive activity. We part,
however, on the notion that efforts to raise a
legal staff are "economic or functional"
while efforts to raise funds and membership
are not. Recruiting, soliciting and
proselytizing are similarly economic and
functional and, at the same time, similarly
expressive. Recruiting conveys the message
that "our organization is worth working for,"
while soliciting and proselytizing convey the
similar functional message that "our charity
is worth giving to" or "our cause is worth
joining."
(b) The law schools' disagreement with the
speech of military recruiters.
Military recruiters visiting law school
campuses undoubtedly speak to students
about the benefits of a career in the military,
and the Solomon Amendment requires law
schools to accept this speech. The law
schools do not seem to take issue with most
of the "expressions of value, opinion, or
endorsement," Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573,
made by military recruiters on campus (to
the extent recruiters suggest that military
careers are honorable and rewarding
experiences). Nor, for the most part, do
military recruiters describing careers in the
military make "statements of fact the [law
schools] would rather avoid." Id.
The law schools' lack of objection to most of
the speech they are forced to accept . . .
raises a key question under the compelled
speech doctrine: to what extent must they
disagree with the Government's message in
order for strict scrutiny to apply? . .
. . . [Supreme Court precedent on this
question is unclear. At the most,] the degree
of disagreement that may be required is
minimal and in any event is present in this
case. . . . [Consequently,] we need not
determine whether such a requirement exists
nor, if so, decipher its precise bounds.
Here the law schools . . . object to conveying
the message that all employers are equal,
and instead would rather only open their
fora and use their resources to support
employers who, in their eyes, do not
discriminate against gays. This objection
constitutes . . . a protected First Amendment
interest. . . . [A]s we have indicated, the act
of being forced to accept speech promoting
an employer whose discriminatory policies
the law schools disagree with is sufficient
"disagreement" to bring the Solomon
Amendment within the Supreme Court's
compelled speech jurisprudence.
(c) The law schools must propagate,
accommodate, and subsidize the military's
expressive message.
. . . Having concluded above that recruiting
is expression, we believe that the Solomon
Amendment compels the law schools to
engage in that expression in all three
proscribed ways: propagation,
accommodation, and subsidy. . . . By
requiring law schools to help military
recruiters "get [their] message out to
students" by distributing newsletters and
posting notices, the Solomon Amendment
compels law schools to propagate the
military's message. Like the forced display
of an unwanted motto on one's license plate .
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. . this is compelled speech. Wooley, 430
U.S. at 717. . . . By requiring schools to
include military recruiters in the interviews
and recruiting receptions the schools
arrange, the Solomon Amendment compels
the schools to accommodate the military's
message in the recruiting-assistance
programs they provide for other employers.
Like the forced inclusion of a parade
contingent . . . this is compelled speech. See
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-81. . . . And by
putting demands on the law schools'
employees and resources, the schools are
compelled to subsidize the military's
recruiting message....
(d) The Solomon Amendment prohibits
disclaimers and, even if it did not, risk of
misattribution is not an element of a
compelled speech violation.
. . . [L]aw schools are expressly precluded
from disclaiming or retorting the military's
recruiting message by the Solomon
Amendment's new requirement that their
treatment of military recruiters be "equal in
quality and scope" to the treatment of other
recruiters. And while the Court has
mentioned the danger of misattribution and
the speaker's ability to disclaim in several of
its compelled speech cases, it has not held to
date that the presence of either factor
eliminated compelled speech concerns.
Therefore, the District Court was wrong to
reject FAIR's compelled speech claims on
the basis of its conclusion that the Solomon
Amendment's requirements posed little risk
of misattribution to the law schools who in
any event could effectively disclaim the
military's message.
(e) The Solomon Amendment would not
likely survive strict scrutiny.
Although the Solomon Amendment impairs
the law schools' First Amendment rights by
compelling them to propagate,
accommodate, and subsidize the military's
recruiting message against their will, the
statute "could still be valid if it were a
narrowly tailored means of serving a
compelling state interest"-i.e., if it passed
strict First Amendment scrutiny. Pacific
Gas, 475 U.S. at 19. . . . But as discussed
above in the context of FAIR's expressive
association claim . . . the Solomon
Amendment does not survive strict scrutiny
because the Government has not
demonstrated (or even argued) that it cannot
recruit effectively by less speech-restrictive
means. Therefore, the balance of interests
likely tips in the law schools' favor.
To summarize, the Solomon Amendment
conditions funding on the law schools'
propagation, accommodation, and subsidy of
the military's recruiting, which is expression.
The Government has not shown that the
assistance from law schools that the
Solomon Amendment requires is narrowly
tailored to advance its interest in recruiting.
FAIR has thus established a reasonable
likelihood of establishing that the Solomon
Amendment unconstitutionally conditions
funding on a basis that infringes law schools'
constitutionally protected interests under the
First Amendment doctrine of compelled
speech.
3. Consideration of O'Brien
A.
[The O'Brien intermediate scrutiny test is
used in cases involving government
regulations of expressive conduct. It is
inapplicable when considering compelled
speech situations or restrictions on First
Amendment associational rights and
therefore does not fit this case. Strict
10
scrutiny is the proper test.]
B.
[Even if the court were to apply the O'Brien
test instead of strict scrutiny, the Solomon
Amendment would still be unconstitutional.
There is no evidence that enforcing the
Amendment is either necessary or effective
for enhancing military recruiting efforts.]
In closing, we emphasize again that we need
not enter the thicket of O'Brien analysis in
this case. We rely on the doctrines of
expressive association and compelled speech
to conclude that FAIR has made the
requisite showing of a likelihood of success
on the merits in support of its motion for a
preliminary injunction. And even under the
intermediate scrutiny test of O'Brien the
Solomon Amendment falters thus far, for the
Government has chosen not to produce any
evidence that it is no more than necessary to
further the Government's interest....
C. Other preliminary injunction factors
By establishing a likelihood of success on
the merits of its unconstitutional condition
claim based on a First Amendment
violation, FAIR has necessarily satisfied the
second element: irreparable harm. Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547,
96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) ("The loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.") . . . On the third
element, we conclude that the balance of
interest tips in FAIR's favor. Without an
injunction, the law schools' First
Amendment rights under the expressive
association doctrine and the compelled
speech doctrine will be impaired during on-
campus recruiting seasons. The
Government, on the other hand, does not
lose the opportunity, in a proceeding on the
merits, to "shoulder its full constitutional
burden of proof' of showing that a less
restrictive alternative would not be as
effective. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 159 L. Ed. 2d
690, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2004). As for
the final element, we believe the public is
best served by enjoining a statute that
unconstitutionally impairs First Amendment
rights.
IV. Conclusion
The Solomon Amendment requires law
schools to express a message that is
incompatible with their educational
objectives, and no compelling governmental
interest has been shown to deny this
freedom. While no doubt military lawyers
are critical to the efficient operation of the
armed forces, mere incantation of the need
for legal talent cannot override a clear First
Amendment impairment. Even were the test
less rigorous than a compelling
governmental riposte to the schools' rights
under the First Amendment, failure
nonetheless is foreordained at this stage, for
the military fails to provide any evidence
that its restrictions on speech are no more
than required to further its interest in
attracting good legal counsel.
In this context, the Solomon Amendment
cannot condition federal funding on law
schools' compliance with it. FAIR has a
reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits and satisfies the other injunctive
elements as well. We reverse and remand
for the District Court to enter a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment.
REVERSED.
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
I would affirm the judgment of the district
court. . . . [E]ssentially my disagreement is
with the [majority's] approach that this is a
case of First Amendment protection in the
nude. It is not.
Rather, the issues before us are threefold.
First, we must inquire whether Appellants
have met the high burden of overcoming the
presumption of constitutionality of a
congressional statute that is not only
bottomed on the Spending Clause, but on a
number of other specific provisions in the
Constitution that deal with Congress'
obligation to support the military. This is
especially relevant because, in the entire
history of the United States, no court
heretofore has ever declared unconstitutional
on First Amendment grounds any
congressional statute specifically designed
to support the military.
Second, we must determine . . . whether a
permissible factual inference-let alone a
compellable one-may be properly drawn
that the law schools' anti-discrimination
policies are violated from the sole
evidentiary datum that a military recruiter
appears on campus for a short time.
Third, only if a proper inference may be
drawn do we meet First Amendment
considerations. The First Amendment is
implicated if and only if, after applying the
"balance-of-interests" test originally
articulated by Justice Brennan in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 US. 609, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 462, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984), it can be
concluded that the operation of the First
Amendment trumps the several clauses of
Articles I and II relating to the spending
power and support of the military.
I would hold that Congress' use of the
spending power and fulfillment of the
requirements to maintain the military under
Articles I and 11 do not unreasonably burden
speech and, therefore, do not offend the First
Amendment. [Applying] the balance-of-
interests test . .. the interest of protecting the
national security of the United States
outweighs the indirect and attenuated
interest in the law schools' speech,
expressive association and academic
freedom rights. The Solomon Amendment
survives the constitutional attack because its
provisions, the 2004 amendments thereto
and related regulations, govern conduct
while only incidentally affecting speech. In
serving its compelling interest in recruiting
military lawyers, the statute does not require
the government to engage in
unconstitutional conduct. Accordingly, with
respect, I dissent.
[After discussing the precept that
congressional statutes are presumed
constitutional, the dissent lectured the
majority for failing to discuss several
important provisions of the Constitution that
provide for the support of the military and
that antedate the promulgation of the
amendments contained in the Bill of Rights.]
Before we address the application of First
Amendment precepts, I am unwilling to
accept that there is a permissible inference,
let alone a compellable one, that a military
presence on campus to recruit, in and of
itself, conjures up an immediate impression
of a discriminatory institution. Throughout
our history, especially in times of war, like
the present conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and the military campaign against the
Al Qaeda, a completely different impression
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is evoked. The men and women in uniform
are almost universally considered as heroes,
sacrificing not only their lives and well-
being, but living separate from all the
comforts of stateside living. Again in the
current era, almost every day, a candidate
for President emphasized his four months as
a swift boat commander in the Vietnam
conflict. As masters of public opinion, the
political apparatus on both sides of the aisle
certainly would not put a premium on
military service if the inference of the
discrimination advanced by Appellants here
was attached thereto. Indeed, the respect to
the man and woman in uniform is so
profound that in the same Presidential
campaign, the other candidate was criticized
for serving at home in a National Guard unit
during the Vietnam conflict instead of going
overseas.
This view of service in the armed forces is at
the farthest polar extreme from the
Appellants' position that the mere presence
of military recruiters conjures up the image
of an institution that discriminates. That the
military does so in fact, does not, in and of
itself, generate the direct and universal
feeling of loathing and abomination to the
extent that their presence on campus a few
days a year deprives law school institutions
of rights inferred from the First Amendment.
* * *
A participant in a military operation cannot
be ipso facto denigrated as a member of a
discriminatory institution. And conjuring up
such an image is the cornerstone of
Appellants First Amendment argument.
In my view it is not necessary to meet any
First Amendment argument because given
the evidentiary datum of a military recruiter
on campus for a few days, a proper
inference may not be drawn that this, in and
of itself, supports a factual inference that the
law school is violating its anti-
discrimination policy. I think that this alone
is sufficient to affirm the judgment of the
district court.
Nevertheless, I go further and assume that
Appellants' suggested inference may
properly be drawn as a fact, and now turn to
a discussion of whether First Amendment
concerns trump the demands placed on
Congress and the President under Articles I
and 11 to support the military.
Our beginning point in approaching a First
Amendment analysis is the balancing-of-
interests test set forth in Justice Brennan's
important opinion in Roberts:
Determining the limits of state
authorities over an individual's
freedom to enter into a particular
association therefore unavoidably
entails a careful assessment of
where that relationship's
objective characteristics locate it
on a spectrum from the most
intimate to the most attenuated of
personal attachments. . . . We
need not mark the potentially
significant points on this terrain
with any precision.
468 U.S. at 620 (emphasis added).
Moreover, important for our immediate
purposes is the recognition that "the right to
associate for expressive purposes is not,
however, absolute. Infringements on that
right may be justified by regulations adopted
to serve compelling state interests, unrelated
to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms." Id. at
623.
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What is perceived to be the flash point of
controversy here is whether the general
interest in public safety has been trumped by
the interests embodied in the First
Amendment. Supporting the government's
position are the line of cases emphasizing
the Supreme Court's deference to Congress'
support of the military. Arrayed against this
is Appellant's insistence that the national
defense interest is trumped by the teachings
of BSA v. Dale and Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston.
The Court has consistently deferred to
congressional decisions relating to the
military. "The case arises in the context of
Congress's authority over national defense
and military affairs, and perhaps in no other
area has the [Supreme] Court accorded
Congress greater deference." Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, (1981).
The Solomon Amendment reflects Congress'
judgment about the requirements of military
recruiting, and "the validity of such
regulations does not turn on a judge's
agreement with the responsible decision
maker concerning the most appropriate
method for promoting significant
government interests." United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
What disturbs me personally and as a judge
is that the law schools seem to approach this
question as an academic exercise, a question
on a constitutional law examination or a
moot court topic, with no thought of the
effect of their action on the supply of
military lawyers and military judges in the
operation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. . . . Much of Appellants' brief takes
the form of conclusory statements that the
military is able to attract top of the line or
high quality students without stepping foot
on campus....
[The dissent argues that this is not a
compelled speech case. Recruiting is an
economic activity, not an expressive
undertaking. Any expression involved in
recruiting is not central to the process, and
would not be attributed to law schools
hosting the recruiters.]
[The majority invokes the Supreme Court's
compelled speech cases for the proposition
that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly
obligates them to "subsidize" military
recruiting. In all these cases the challenged
statutes obligated individuals to make direct
payments of money to finance private
speech with which they disagreed. Here, in
contrast, the recruiting activities of military
recruiters are paid for exclusively with
federal tax revenues; the Solomon
Amendment does not obligate educational
institutions to pay one red cent to the
government or to a private organization.
Although Appellants complain of having to
provide "scarce interview space" and "make
appointments," this kind of physical
accommodation simply does not present the
constitutional concern underlying the
Supreme Court's compelled speech cases.]
In challenging the district court's reasoning,
Appellants also seek to analogize this case
to the teachings of Dale. ...
Let me now count the two ways the
Solomon Amendment differs from the state
statute in Dale, both of which are critical to
the law's impact vel non on associational
interests. First, the Solomon Amendment
simply does not impinge on the right of
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educational institutions to determine their
membership. See 10 U.S.C. § 983. It does
not purport to tell colleges and universities
whom to admit as students or whom to hire
as professors or administrators. It merely
requires them to allow the transient presence
of recruiters, who are not a part of the law
school and do not become members through
their mere presence....
Second, recruiting is an economic activity
whose expressive content is strictly
secondary to its instrumental goals....
In this case, the law schools portray their
efforts to keep military recruiters off their
campuses as "quintessential expression."
But when an institution excludes military
recruiters from its campuses or otherwise
restricts their access to students, it is
engaging in something different from
"quintessential expression." It is engaging
in a course of conduct which contains both
nonspeech and speech elements. The acts
which the law schools claim they are
compelled to do by virtue of the military's
post-2001 "unwritten policy"-
disseminating and posting military
recruitment literature, making appointments
for military recruiters to meet with students
and providing military reciuiters a place to
meet with students-also contain both
nonspeech and speech elements.
The constitutional framework for evaluating
such laws is provided by O'Brien.
Regulation of conduct that imposes
incidental burdens on expression is
constitutional if "it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."
391 US. at 377. . . . Regulations of conduct
that place incidental burdens on expression
are not subject to a least-restrictive-
alternative requirement "so long as the
means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government's
interest" . . . Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
The Solomon Amendment readily passes
constitutional muster under these
constitutional standards. The Appellants
themselves do not dispute that the
government has a substantial interest-
indeed, a compelling one-in recruiting
talented men and women for the nation's
armed forces. As the Court recognized in
O'Brien, "the Nation has a vital interest in
having a system for raising armies that
functions with maximum efficiency. . ." 391
U.S. at 381. Effective military recruiting is
the linchpin of that system....
The Appellants argue that because the
Solomon Amendment is intended to
facilitate military recruiting, and because
recruiters speak to students, the
governmental interest underlying the
Solomon Amendment "is not unrelated to
expression." But the question posed by
O'Brien is not whether the governmental
interest is "unrelated to expression," but
instead whether the interest "is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression." 391
U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). The
Appellants' argument deliberately omits the
touchstone of suppression from the
constitutional test. Once it is recognized
that suppression of expression is the focus of
O'Brien, the Appellants' argument falls
apart, for the governmental interests served
by the Solomon Amendment are manifestly
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unrelated to the suppression of anyone's
expression,
It bears constant emphasis that the First
Amendment test involves a balancing-of-
interests as repeatedly emphasized above.
The O'Brien measure is quintessentially
correct because this case involves a
weighing of the government's interest in
national defense and Appellants' interest in
First Amendment protections. . . . [I]t is
difficult to conjure a case that is a more
perfect fit for . . . O'Brien.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
dissent.
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"Court to Review Military Recruiting at Colleges"
Washington Post
May 3, 2005
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court announced yesterday
that it will decide whether some law schools
may curb military recruiters' access to their
students in protest of the U.S. armed forces'
ban on openly gay members.
On its face, the case is a struggle between
Congress's power of the purse and academic
freedom; the court is being asked to rule on
the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, a federal law that requires
universities to give military recruiters equal
access, or risk millions of dollars in federal
funding.
In a larger sense, however, the case is a
battle within the larger culture wars, a clash
between the Bush administration, which is
deeply committed to its support base among
social conservatives, and its perennial critics
on the nation's law school faculties, many of
whom are no less committed to gay rights.
Thirty-one law schools, grouped under the
banner of the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights (FAIR), say that the
Solomon Amendment is inconsistent with
their constitutional right to free speech.
They say they should be free to shun a
policy they consider discriminatory.
But supporters of the law say that those who
want the government's money often have to
take it on the government's terms, with
strings attached.
As currently enforced, the Solomon
Amendment could result in the cutoff of
federal money to an entire university
because of the actions of any
undergraduate or graduate programs.
of its
So far, though, no university has lost federal
money.
In September 2003, FAIR, along with other law
teachers and students, sued to block
enforcement of the amendment but lost in
federal district court in New Jersey.
Last year, however, the Philadelphia-based
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit
granted FAIR an injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment,
saying it "requires law schools to express a
message that is incompatible with their
educational objectives, and no compelling
governmental interest has been shown to deny
this freedom."
That is the judgment the Bush administration
seeks to reverse at the Supreme Court.
"Effective recruitment is essential to sustain an
all-volunteer military, particularly in a time of
war," Acting Solicitor General Paul D. Clement
told the court in a brief. "The Solomon
Amendment reflects Congress's judgment that a
crucial component of an effective military
recruitment program is equal access to college
and university campuses."
The roots of the Solomon Amendment, named
for its House sponsor, former representative
Gerald B.H. Solomon (R-N.Y.), lie in the
1980s, when some law schools began denying
access and assistance to military recruiters,
citing the armed services' ban on openly gay
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interviews.
The 1993 promulgation of the current "don't
ask, don't tell" policy, which permits gay
men and lesbians to serve in the armed
forces as long as they do not openly discuss
their sexual orientation, did little to settle the
controversy.
Billed as a compromise alternative to
President Bill Clinton's proposed lifting of
the ban on gays in the military, "don't ask,
don't tell" was immediately decried by
supporters of gay rights, and the military has
continued to investigate and expel gay
personnel.
The first version of the Solomon
Amendment, adopted in 1994, threatened
schools only with a loss of Pentagon
funding. In 1997, Congress expanded the
amendment's scope to include money from
other agencies.
Under Clinton, the Defense Department
permitted schools to refuse to help military
recruiters, as long as they let them at least
visit campus.
Harvard Law School, for example, allowed
military recruiters to interview students at
the offices of its Veterans Association, but
did not use its own personnel to set up the
This approach allowed universities to
federal funding without violating
antidiscrimination policies.
retair
theii
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush
administration concluded that the law schools
must provide the same services to military
recruiters as they offer to others.
Among the schools told that they might be in
danger of losing federal money was Yale,
whose law school had been letting recruiters
use a room to meet with students, but had not
been helping arrange interviews.
Last year, Congress enacted this new Pentagon
policy into law, requiring access "that is at least
equal in quality and scope" as that offered other
employers.
The membership of FAIR includes New York
University, Georgetown and George
Washington University law schools. But 13 of
the group's 31 members chose not to identify
themselves publicly "for fear of retribution" by
Congress or donors, said E. Joshua Rosenkranz,
a lawyer who represents FAIR.
The case is Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No.04-1152.
Oral arguments will take place in the fall, and a
decision is expected by July 2006.
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"Law Schools' Case vs. Gov't off to High Court"
Herald-Sun (Durham, NC)
May 9, 2005
Kris Kitto
WASHINGTON-When a military recruiter
visited Duke University's law school this
year to conduct on-campus interviews,
student Teresa Sakash didn't drop off a
r6sum6. Instead, she submitted a petition.
Sakash, president of Outlaw, Duke's gay-
student organization, and the approximately
200 other students who signed the
grievance, were protesting the Solomon
Amendment, which requires law schools to
allow military recruiting on campus even
though the Pentagon's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy on homosexuality violates the
schools' nondiscrimination guidelines.
Under the law, universities could risk all
federal funding if they bar the military from
distributing employment information and
wooing top law students to their ranks
alongside the other on-campus recruiters.
While peer institutions around the country
have had Solomon Amendment run-ins
much more strident than the one at Duke,
final word on the issue could be handed
down by year's end. The Supreme Court
announced last week it will hear Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, the case that pits the government
against a group of 30 law schools that claim
the amendment is unconstitutional.
At the core of the debate is this question:
Do law schools have a First Amendment
right to avoid associating with groups that
don't share their nondiscrimination views?
Both Sakash, 28, and her classmate Jeffrey
Filipink, 22, think so.
"Our opinion essentially is asking the
military to overturn the 'Don't Ask, Don't
Tell' policy if they wish to recruit," he said.
"It isn't an anti-military standpoint. It's an
anti-discrimination standpoint."
The case has a specific tie to
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky is one
named plaintiffs.
Duke:
of the
He and the other professors and student
organizations who make up FAIR filed a
lawsuit in a New Jersey district court two
years ago to stop enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment. FAIR lost and
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third District, which reversed the ruling
and allowed law schools to exclude the
military from recruiting on campus.
"I think it's about law schools
First Amendment right . . .
compelled to convey the
message," Chemerinsky said.
having the
to not be
military's
Though all institutions have the option of
declining federal funds if they don't agree
with government policy, he said that no
college can afford to do that.
"The reality is that, for most major
universities, they depend greatly on federal
funds," he said. "It's not a realistic option.
It's pure coercion."
But Chemerinsky's colleague at Duke, Scott
Silliman, sees the case differently.
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Silliman, who spent 25 years as a military
attorney, said Congress has final say on how
the country's money is spent.
"The law schools can't demand federal
funding," he said. "So, somewhere the
balance needs to be struck. This case has
been cast as the law schools' right to choose
who can come into the building and the
campuses against the military's 'Don't Ask,
Don't Tell' policy," he said. "It's a little bit
more complex than that."
He said since the military's policy on
homosexuality is the law, military officials
can't just stop enforcing it. "This isn't
something the military can just turn off and
say, 'Okay, this is something we're not going
to do any more,' " he said.
Chemerinsky, on the other hand, said he
sees the case as a way to eventually overturn
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," which has been the
official government policy since early in the
Clinton administration.
"My hope is that if law schools enforce their
anti-discrimination policy," he said, "that
over time that will put the pressure on
Congress to change the statute."
Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Joe Richard
said because Congress enacted the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the military must
abide by it. The discrimination issue then,
he said, is out of the question.
"They can protest the policies all they want,"
he said, "provided that military recruiters are
given equal access."
The Solomon Amendment was passed in
1995, initially withholding Department of
Defense funds to noncompliant universities.
Revised several times since, the law now
requires the withdrawal of all federal
funding to schools that bar military
recruiters. And Silliman said the
amendment's interpretation changed in 2001
after President Bush took office.
Officials at both Duke and the law school at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill said they post signs notifying students
of the military's policy on homosexuality
when military recruiters come to campus.
Spokespersons at the two schools said they
have a few students every year who join the
military's Judge Advocate General, or JAG,
corps after graduation.
The military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
policy became law in 1993 and forbids
homosexual members of the military to
either engage in homosexual sex acts or
disclose their sexual orientation. Under this
policy, gay law students could enter the JAG
Corps if they kept their sexual orientation
private and abstained from homosexual sex.
Even though Duke law student Sakash, who
is a lesbian and said she had military career
aspirations at one time, would not be able to
interview openly for such a position,
Silliman said this case is more about
presenting all career-related information to
law students and less about the military's
discrimination practices.
"I think that what is lost in this battle is the
right of individual law school students to
find out information about employment in
the military regardless of whether they seek
to join the military or not," he said.
But on the other side of campus,
Chemerinsky sees the students' position in
another light.
"We should never have a situation where
facilities are available to some students but
not others," he said.
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"U.S. Defense Dept. Sued on College Recruitment"
Boston Globe
September 20, 2003
Marcella Bombardieri
A nationwide group of law professors, law
schools, and students filed suit yesterday
against the US Department of Defense and
other government agencies, charging them
with violating the First Amendment by
forcing law schools to allow military
recruiters on campus.
The suit, led by Kent Greenfield, a Boston
College law professor, marks the first
widespread effort to challenge the Defense
Department, which last year began
threatening to yank virtually all federal
funds from colleges whose law schools
continued to bar military recruiters from on-
campus job interviews.
Many law schools, including Harvard,
Boston College, and Boston University, had
previously barred recruiters from campus
because the ban on gays serving openly in
the military conflicted with their
nondiscrimination rules.
Faced with the possibility of losing hundreds
of millions of dollars, almost all American
law schools backed down from their bans,
including Harvard, BU, BC, Yale,
Columbia, and New York University.
Several university leaders said they regretted
the switch, but had no choice if they wanted
to preserve their federal research funding.
The plaintiffs in the lawsuit say that the
legislation underlying the Defense
Department's crackdown, a law passed in
1994 called the Solomon Amendment, is
riddled with flaws.
"It's not the American way to condition
government benefits on whether you agree
with the government," said Greenfield, who
founded the organization leading the suit.
"The Solomon Amendment was passed to
send the message that academic institutions
were being too liberal. They are using this
law to reach into the core of our educational
philosophy and change it, and that's contrary
to the First Amendment."
Boston College itself is not a party to the
suit.
In order to take up this fight, Greenfield
recently formed the Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, an organization of
law schools and other academic institutions.
It filed the suit along with the Society of
American Law Teachers, a liberal
association of some 800 law professors.
Also named are two student groups-one at
Boston College Law School, the other at
Rutgers University School of Law-and
three Rutgers law students.
Greenfield's group, FAIR, is not releasing
the names of member schools, which he
describes as nationwide and "not in the
hundreds, but not tiny either." He said
anonymity is important to protect law
schools from retribution.
Other members of the group's board are
legal scholars from such schools as Yale,
Stanford, Georgetown, NYU, and the
University of Southern California. Local
law schools contacted said that they were
not involved in the suit.
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"Pentagon, Colleges Duel on Gay Policy"
Hartford Courant (Connecticut)
October 8, 2003
Kim Martineau
Far from Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon
has been fighting a much different kind of
battle: the campaign for public acceptance of
its policy against gays.
The Pentagon has taken the fight to some of
the nation's most prestigious universities-
including Yale University, President Bush's
alma mater-where it has sought the right to
sit with other employers recruiting the
nation's top law students.
For more than two decades, Yale Law
School had refused to let military recruiters
participate in its job placement program as a
protest against the military's ban on gays.
Frustrated by the open dissent toward its
policy and years of stalemate, the Pentagon
reached into its arsenal and dropped the
equivalent of a nuclear bomb-threatening
to slash billions in federal aid to schools that
continue to restrict military recruiters. For
Yale, the cost of defending its principles
would have exceeded $300 million a year.
Last fall, Yale and other universities
nationwide retreated.
But the war is not over. A group of
unnamed law schools has filed a lawsuit in
federal court challenging the 1995 Solomon
Amendment, the law that allows the
Pentagon to cut federal aid to universities
that limit the military's access. The
Pentagon says the military's strength
depends on its ability to attract the most
qualified candidates-although its most
recent campus offensive, launched in the
aftermath of Sept. 11, comes at a time of
solid enlistment and renewed patriotism.
Critics say there's more to the military's
campaign than just recruiting.
"It's not about military recruiting. It's about
this symbolic clash over values," says Aaron
Belkin, a political science professor at the
University of California at Santa Barbara.
"They don't want to be branded by civil
society as discriminators. Branding them as
discriminators undermines their honor and
integrity."
The Pentagon has cast the issue of gays in
the military as one of national security,
adopting its "don't ask, don't tell" policy a
decade ago. Allowing gays to serve openly
would threaten troop cohesion, violate the
privacy rights of heterosexuals and hurt
recruiting, the military has long argued.
The law schools call it something else:
discrimination. "Their policy of excluding
gays and lesbians from the military is
morally offensive and is not appropriate for
a democracy that believes in equality," Yale
Professor Robert Burt said.
Army and Navy recruiters will hold
interviews on Thursday and Friday at a hotel
near the Yale campus where all recruiters
conduct interviews. But Adam Sofen, a
Yale Law Journal editor and Harvard
graduate who comes from a family of Navy
men, won't be among those interviewed.
Nor will any other gay and lesbian students
who refuse to lie about their identity.
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"I don't want to be put in a situation where I
have to choose between serving my country
and respecting myself," Sofen said.
Students have passed out rainbow stickers to
recruiters who have signed Yale's
nondiscrimination policy, to voice their
criticism of "don't ask, don't tell." Students
are also planning a protest. Last fall, some
students wore camouflage gags in protest of
the policy.
By the end of the month, a group of Yale
professors intends to file a separate lawsuit
challenging the Defense Department's
interpretation of the Solomon Amendment.
Yale has argued repeatedly that it's not
obligated to treat the military the same way
it treats employers who pledge not to
discriminate. The professors say Yale has
accommodated military recruiters, providing
them with student contact information and
classrooms to use for interviews.
Students and professors at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School filed a similar suit
last week.
"They're insisting on special treatment-the
right to have an openly discriminatory
policy and yet have access to the law
school," said Arthur Leonard, a professor at
New York Law School. "The government is
really holding the universities hostage here."
In an indication of what's at stake, the law
schools seeking to overturn Solomon have
refused to reveal themselves, fearing
retaliation. They recently incorporated in
New Jersey as the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights and filed their lawsuit in
U.S. District Court in Newark. The suit
claims the amendment violates academic
freedom by forcing universities to give up
free speech rights in order to receive federal
funding.
A spokesman for the Department of Defense
referred questions to the Department of
Justice, which declined comment.
In legal papers, the Defense Department has
questioned whether the law schools have
standing if their identities remain secret.
The department said it has no desire to
restrict academic freedom and pointed out
that Congress has long attached conditions
to federal aid as a way of pushing policy
objectives.
In 1999, an Air Force captain signed Yale's
non-discrimination policy, only after
inserting the word "unlawful" before
"discrimination," reflecting lower court
rulings that have upheld "don't ask, don't
tell." The letter was one of two dozen
included in the lawsuit, revealing an
exasperated exchange between Yale and
military officials.
Yale sent the form back, declaring its policy
"not subject to modification by prospective
employers."
Capt. Wayne Gordon wrote back: "I
understand your concerns regarding
discrimination on the part of prospective
employers. However, the U.S. Air Force
does not unlawfully discriminate in its hiring
practices, and my correction to your form
reflected that policy."
Congress passed "don't ask, don't tell" in
1993, as a compromise to President
Clinton's proposal to open the military to
gays. A year later, U.S. Rep. Gerald
Solomon, R-N.Y., demanded that
universities give the military more respect.
He proposed cutting off defense funding to
schools that bar recruiters from campus to
"send a message over the wall of the ivory
tower."
That policy was later expanded to include
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funding from other federal agencies,
including the Department of Health and
Human Services, which awards $12 billion a
year to universities for research on cancer,
AIDS and other deadly diseases.
Yale was one of the first law schools in the
country to include gays in its
nondiscrimination policy in 1978. Even
then, it was a bold move.
"The universal feeling among gay students I
knew (or came to know later) was that you
could not have a successful legal career if
you were professionally open about your
minority sexual orientation," William
Eskridge Jr., a 1978 graduate who now
teaches law at Yale, wrote in a legal
document in the Solomon lawsuit. "So no
one was."
Eskridge credits Yale's action for
influencing landmark legal victories for
gays. In June, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down Texas' ban on private
consensual sex between gays. Ruth Harlow,
a 1986 Yale Law School graduate,
masterminded the legal brief seeking to
overturn that ban; Paul Smith, a 1979
graduate, argued the case before the court.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin
Scalia cited Eskridge's 1999 book, Gaylaw:
Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet.
By 1990, all accredited law schools included
gays in their nondiscrimination policies.
The Defense Department-the nation's
largest employer was not the only one to
be banned from career service programs at
those schools. At Yale, the Christian Legal
Society was barred in the 1990s because it
planned to screen job applicants by religious
affiliation and orientation.
By its own admission, the military has had
no trouble attracting talent. In a letter to
New York University Law School last year,
an Army official noted: "Competition has
become very keen in the past few years.
Unfortunately, that means some very
qualified applicants will not be selected for
the position."
Nearly 9,000 gays have been discharged
since the "don't ask, don't tell" policy took
effect, according to the Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network, a watchdog group
in Washington. The policy was questioned
last year when a group of Arabic-linguists
who were gay were fired.
Historically, military discharges drop during
times of war and climb when soldiers return
home, said Steve Rails, spokesman for the
legal defense network.
"It's a vivid example of the hypocrisy of the
policy," he said. "If a gay service member is
qualified to serve in a time of war, then he
or she is qualified to serve in a time of
peace."
So far, 24 countries have lifted their bans on
gays in the military, including Australia,
Britain, Israel and Canada.
In the United States, a retired judge advocate
general for the Navy, Rear Adm. John
Hutson, called for lifting the ban in an
article published in the National Law
Journal in August. Initially, Hutson
supported the ban. Since then, "Queer Eye
for the Straight Guy" has won a wide
following on cable television and New
Hampshire has an openly gay Episcopal
bishop.
"It's not the admirals and generals who have
to worry about taking showers and sleeping
in berthing areas with people of a different
orientation," Hutson said. "It's the young
people, 18, 19, 20 years old-and they don't
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on narrowing the applicant pool.
The Pentagon charges that the law schools
are blocking its recruiting efforts at a time of
national need. But Yale law student Matt
Alsdorf wondered why the military insists
"It's really a shame," Alsdorf said, "for our
country, at this point, not to take the most
qualified people for the job.
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have the same hang-ups."
"Challenge to Military-Recruiter Law Heats Up
in Newark's Federal Court"
New Jersey Law Journal
October 13, 2003
Mary P. Gallagher
The controversy over the military's "don't
ask, don't tell" policy moved to a new
battleground last Friday, as a federal judge
in Newark heard a challenge to a U.S. law
that cuts off funds to schools that bar
military recruiters.
The plaintiffs in Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 03 Civ.
4433, asked for a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the law. They
argued that immediate relief is necessary in
light of the imminent fall recruiting season.
The defense argued for dismissal on the
ground that the plaintiffs lack standing. The
Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights is an association of unnamed law
schools. While the plaintiffs say free speech
is at issue, the defendants say it is an
exercise of spending power.
U.S. District Judge John Lifland said he
would decide the motions soon.
At the heart of the dispute is the 1995
Solomon amendment, 10 US.C. 983[b]. It
forbids the Departments of Defense,
Education, Labor, Transportation, Health
and Human Services, and Homeland
Security from providing funds to an
institution of higher learning "with a policy
or practice . . . that prohibits, or in effect
prevents" military recruiters from gaining
access to the campus or students.
Student aid under the federal work-study
program, supplemental educational
opportunity grant program and Perkins loans
fall under the law.
E. Joshua Rosenkranz, who represents the
plaintiffs, tried to counter the government's
argument that FAIR could not assert the
rights of its unnamed member law schools,
who refuse to be identified for fear of
retaliation.
He announced that Golden Gate University
Law School in San Francisco agreed to be
identified as a forum member. Golden Gate
is one of two dozen law schools threatened
with loss of funds if it did not suspend its
nondiscrimination policy to allow access to
military recruiters. The school was prepared
to state it would reactivate its policy of not
discriminating based on sexual orientation if
the threat were lifted, said Rosenkranz, a
partner with Heller Ehrman White &
McAuliffe in New York.
Still, Mark Quinlivan, senior trial counsel
with the Department of Justice and attorney
for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
and the other defendants, insisted that FAIR
must identify its members.
Rosenkranz responded that FAIR was
formed because "law schools did not feel
they could jeopardize their own funding."
At the close of argument, he offered to
provide a list of members for in camera
review, and Lifland took him up on it.
Rosenkranz urged that faculty and students
have standing because, as a result of
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government intervention, they have been
deprived of the open academic environment
promised by school policy. He cited the
1981 decision by the Third U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in N.J-Phila. Presbytery
v. NJ State Board, 654 F.2d 868.
Quinlivan told Lifland it was the plaintiffs'
burden to establish standing based on
"concrete, individualized harm." Only
educational institutions, not professors or
students or groups of them, can claim harm
from loss of federal funding, he said.
Quinlivan
whether a
university
when the
funding.
also raised questions about
law school that is part of a larger
can raise the challenge alone
entire university stands to lose
The complaint alleges that the decision by
the Department of Defense in 2000 to deny
funds to an entire university, rather than just
a law school that refuses to comply, is a
misapplication of the law. The plaintiffs
also contend that the military's recent
insistence on not just access but parity of
treatment with employers who do not
discriminate exceeds the law's requirements.
Schools that resorted to compromises, like
using non-law school personnel to arrange
interviews at off campus locations, have
recently come under fire for not providing
parity, even though, plaintiffs allege, the
different treatment did not impair hiring
efforts.
Rosenkranz argued that free speech is
implicated. The threat of Solomon
enforcement not only interferes with
schools' freedom to express their own anti-
bias views but also compels them to endorse
the military's message-"we want you only
if you're not gay"-by hosting its recruiters,
arranging their interviews and disseminating
their literature, he said.
"This case is ultimately about whether law
schools have the ability to shape their own
environment and to teach by word and
deed."
Quinlivan disagreed. The case involves the
spending clause case, not speech, he argued.
Law schools retain the right "to decide
whether they want to accept federal funds or
whether to discriminate against military
recruiters is more important to their core
mission," he argued.
Quinlivan said there is a "panoply of First
Amendment activity in opposition" to
military recruiting at law schools-including
student protests, official statements and sit-
ins-that show speech is not being
suppressed.
Rosenkranz answered that the legislative
history makes it clear the law was aimed at
dissenting campuses. He describes an
incident where, though not a single student
signed up to interview, interviewers showed
up anyway and sat in an empty room all day,
showing that their intent was to make a
statement, not to hire, said Rosenkranz.
The government has a compelling interest in
ensuring able candidates for the military,
contended Quinlivan. He also argued that
threats of enforcement against schools by
military recruiters, who lack the power of
the purse, do not amount to official action
subject to court challenge when no law
school has yet been denied funding.
The "power of the threat has been enough"
and schools are not required to incur a
penalty before they can assert free speech,
responded Rosenkranz.
The other plaintiffs in FAIR are the 900-
member Society of Law Teachers, the
Rutgers Gay & Lesbian Caucus, Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky of University of the
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Southern California Law School, Professor
Sylvia Law of New York University Law
School, the Coalition for Equality, a student
group at Boston College Law School, and
Rutgers Law-Newark students Pam
Nickisher, Leslie Fischer and Michael
Blauschild.
The FAIR case is not the only challenge to
the Solomon amendment. On Oct. 1, 21
professors, six students and a student
association at University of Pennsylvania
Law School filed Burbank v. Rumsfeld, 03
Civ. 5497, in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
That case raises similar constitutional and
statutory arguments. It alleges that since
1998 the military was allowed to interview
at on-campus but non-law school locations
and arrangements were made through the
University's Office of Career Services,
rather than by the law school placement
office. That changed after the university at
large was threatened in January with a loss
of at least $500 million in federal funds for
research, teaching and student aid.
The 165-member Association of American
Law Schools, which declined to be part of
the FAIR suit, requires members to
condition employer access on a written
agreement not to discriminate on various
grounds, including sexual orientation. Most
law schools, including those in New Jersey
and the University of Pennsylvania, have
policies condemning such discrimination.
The AALS requires a member school that
allows military recruiters to post a notice of
its disagreement with "don't ask, don't tell"
at minimum and urges other forms of
"amelioration."
Rutgers-Newark Dean Stuart Deutsch says
that a few years ago, after the military
threatened funding for the entire university,
the law school felt compelled to open its
doors.
The school posts notice on the interview-
room door explaining it is letting in the
recruiters to avoid losing student aid and
calling discrimination against homosexuals
"completely unacceptable" and the Solomon
amendment "morally wrong."
"The military's using a sledgehammer to
solve a small problem," says Deutsch. "I
personally support the law suits. I hope they
succeed and I hope they succeed fairly
quickly."
Rutgers-Camden also posts notice, says
Dean Ray Solomon. The school has not
tried to exclude military recruiters, however.
"We have a number of students who go into
JAG every year, and it's important for us to
allow them the opportunity," he explains.
"At very elite schools where no one goes
into JAG, it's very easy to take a symbolic
position," he adds. "I would like the
Solomon amendment to go away-if it did,
we might do things very differently."
Seton Hall Law Dean Patrick Hobbs did not
return calls seeking comment.
"Don't ask, don't tell," adopted in 1993,
lifted the outright ban on homosexuals
serving in the armed forces, but barred them
from discussing their sexual orientation and
forbade supervisors from inquiring into it.
The Department of Defense says 9,414
service members were discharged under the
policy as of Sept. 30, 2002, the last year for
which figures were available.
Former Judge Advocate General John
Hutson, who helped formulate "don't ask,
don't tell," called for its repeal in an Aug. 11
opinion piece published in the National Law
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Journal, a publication affiliated with the
New Jersey Law Journal. He described it as
"well-intentioned" but "badly flawed" and
"virtually unworkable."
."Don't ask, don't tell' bought us some time
to mature, but having endured a decade of
this policy and having been given a prod by
the Supreme Court [in Lawrence v. Texas],
the time for re-examination has come," he
said. Lawrence held in June that Texas'
same-sex-only anti-sodomy law violated due
process.
Hutson, now dean of Franklin Pierce Law
Center in New Hampshire, calls himself
"ambivalent" on the Solomon amendment,
however. Recalling his time in the JAG
Corps, he says, "when my recruiters would
come back and say they were down in the
furnace room figuratively, but almost
literally, I think that was a mistake."
FAIR's local counsel is Andrew Dwyer, a
partner with Newark's Dwyer & Dunnigan.
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"3 rd Circuit Voids Law School Funding Restriction"
Legal Intelligencer
November 30, 2004
Shannon P. Duffy
In a major victory for gay rights advocates,
the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled that Congress cannot force law schools
to allow U.S. armed forces recruiters on
campus-by threatening a cut-off of all
federal funding-since the military's policy
of excluding gays and lesbians conflicts with
the anti-discrimination policies enforced by
most law schools.
The 102-page decision in Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights v.
Rumsfeld is the first federal appellate
decision to address the constitutionality of
the Solomon Amendment, a 1994 law that
requires universities to provide access to
military recruiters on campus or forfeit
federal funding.
By a 2-1 vote, the court found that FAIR-a
coalition of law schools and law
professors-is likely to succeed in its claim
that the Solomon Amendment violates the
law schools' First Amendment rights by
compelling them to engage in speech they
disagree with.
"The Solomon Amendment requires law
schools to express a message that is
incompatible with their educational
objectives, and no compelling governmental
interest has been shown to deny this
freedom," U.S. Circuit Judge Thomas L.
Ambro wrote in an opinion joined by Senior
U.S. Circuit Judge Walter K. Stapleton.
As a result, Ambro found that U.S. District
Judge John C. Lifland of the District of New
Jersey erred in refusing to issue a
preliminary injunction barring enforcement
of the Solomon Amendment because the
plaintiffs had shown that the law violates
their free speech rights while the military
had failed to show that it had a "compelling"
need to conduct its recruiting on campus.
"The government has failed to proffer a
shred of evidence that the Solomon
Amendment materially enhances its stated
goal. And not only might other methods of
recruitment yield acceptable results, they
might actually fare better than the current
system," Ambro wrote.
"While no doubt military lawyers are critical
to the efficient operation of the armed
forces, mere incantation of the need for legal
talent cannot override a clear First
Amendment impairment," Ambro wrote.
The reality, Ambro found, is that the
controversy surrounding the law could be
harming the military's recruiting efforts.
"It may plausibly be the case that the
Solomon Amendment, which has generated
much ill will toward the military on law
school campuses, actually impedes
recruitment," Ambro wrote.
But in a lengthy dissenting opinion, Senior
U.S. Circuit Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert said
he would have upheld the lower court's
decision to uphold the law.
"I apply the balance-of-interests test and
decide that the interest of protecting the
national security of the United States
outweighs the indirect and attenuated
interest in the law schools' speech,
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expressive association and academic
freedom rights," Aldisert wrote.
Aldisert said he believes the Solomon
Amendment passes constitutional muster
because its provisions "govern conduct
while only incidentally affecting speech."
In the suit, FAIR was joined by the Society
for Law Teachers Inc., the Coalition for
Equality, the Rutgers Gay and Lesbian
Caucus, two law professors and three law
students.
Soon after FAIR's suit was filed in New
Jersey, similar challenges to the Solomon
Amendment were brought by law professors
and students at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and Yale Law
School. But district courts handling the
Penn and Yale cases have not yet ruled on
the constitutionality of the law.
In his opening paragraphs, Ambro traced the
history of the conflict between law schools
and military.
Ambro noted that law schools have "long
maintained formal policies of non-
discrimination that withhold career
placement services from employers who
exclude employees and applicants based on
such factors as race, gender and religion."
In the 1970s, Ambro found, law schools
began expanding those policies to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
That trend, he said, culminated in the 1990
decision by the American Association of
Law Schools to include sexual orientation as
a protected category.
Today, Ambro found, "virtually every law
school" now has a comprehensive non-
discrimination policy that includes sexual
orientation.
By contrast, Ambro said, the U.S. military
"excludes service members based on
evidence of homosexual conduct and/or
orientation."
Beginning in the 1980s, Ambro said, some
law schools began refusing to provide access
and assistance to military recruiters.
In 1994, Rep. Gerald Solomon, R-N.Y.,
sponsored an amendment to the annual
defense appropriation bill that proposed to
withhold Defense Department funding from
any educational institution with a policy of
denying or effectively preventing the
military from obtaining entry to campuses,
or access to students on campuses, for
recruiting purposes.
But the law was amended in 1999 to apply
only to those schools that "prohibited" or
"prevented" military recruiters from gaining
access to students.
As a result of that change, Ambro found that
"many law schools avoided the Solomon
Amendment's penalty" by "merely allowing
military recruiters to gain access to
campuses."
In doing so, Ambro said, the law schools
were able to reaffirm their opposition to the
military's exclusionary employment policy
by not providing them "affirmative
assistance" in the manner provided to other
recruiters.
But after the September 2001 terrorist
attacks, Ambro found that the Department of
Defense began applying "an informal policy
of requiring not only access to campuses,
but treatment equal to that accorded other
recruiters."
In letters to university presidents, the DOD
said the law required schools "to provide
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military recruiters access to students equal in
quality and scope to that provided to other
recruiters.'"
Earlier this year, Ambro found, Congress
amended law again to incorporate the
Defense Department's informal policy.
"Now, under the terms of the statute itself,
law schools and their parent institutions are
penalized for preventing military
representatives from gaining entry to
campuses for the purpose of military
recruiting 'in a manner that is at least equal
in quality and scope to the [degree of] access
to campuses and to students that is provided
to any other employer,"' Ambro wrote.
In the suit, FAIR argued that the Solomon
Amendment impairs law schools' First
Amendment rights under the doctrine of
''expressive association."
Ambro agreed, finding that the law forced
schools to participate in government speech.
Ironically, Ambro found that the law
schools' position was supported by the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale in which the
justices held that the Boy Scouts could not
be forced to accept an openly gay
scoutmaster.
"Just as the Boy Scouts believed that
'homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the
Scout Oath,' the law schools believe that
employment discrimination is inconsistent
with their commitment to justice and
fairness," Ambro wrote.
"Just as the Boy Scouts maintained that
'homosexuals do not provide a role model
consistent with the expectations of scouting
families,' the law schools maintain that
military recruiters engaging in exclusionary
hiring 'do not provide a role model
consistent with the expectations of,' their
students and the legal community," Ambro
wrote.
Likewise, Ambro said, while the Boy Scouts
argued that they were aiming to "inculcate
[youth] with the Boy Scouts' values-both
expressively and by example," the law
schools, too, say they are aiming to
"inculcate their students with their chosen
values by expression and example in the
promulgation and enforcement of their
nondiscrimination policies."
Ambro noted that, in Dale, the justices held
that an openly gay man's presence in the
Boy Scouts "would, at the very least, force
the organization to send a message, both to
youth members and the world, that the Boy
Scouts accept homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."
Likewise, Ambro said, "the presence of
military recruiters would, at the very least,
force the law schools to send a message,
both to students and the legal community,
that the law schools 'accept' employment
discrimination 'as a legitimate form of
behavior.'"
In a strongly worded dissent, Aldisert said
he was personally disturbed that law schools
would, "as an academic exercise," ignore the
consequences that a recruiting ban would
have on the military's ability to compete
with well-heeled law firms for young talent.
"They obviously do not desire that our men
and women in the armed services, all
members of a closed society, obtain
optimum justice in military courts with the
best-trained lavvyers and judges," Aldisert
wrote.
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Aldisert said he rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the schools were being asked
to violate their own anti-discrimination
policies by welcoming recruiters who won't
take openly gay men and women.
"We cannot conclude that the mere presence
of a uniformed military recruiter permits or
compels the inference that a law school's
anti-discrimination policy is violated,"
Aldisert wrote. "The subjective
idiosyncratic impressions of some law
students, some professors, or some anti-war
protesters are not the test. What we know as
men and women we cannot forget as
judges."
The Justice Department, which represented
the government in the case, said it was
examining the decision and reviewing its
appeal options.
"The United States continues to believe that
the Solomon Amendment is constitutional.
As we argued in our brief, we believe that
Congress may deny federal funds to
universities which discriminate and may act
to protect the men and women of our armed
forces in their ability to recruit Americans
who wish to join them in serving our
country," the agency said in a statement, The
Associated Press reported.
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